Special Colloquium

Raghavan T.E.S.
UIC
Bob Aumann, the game theorist and the recent Nobel Laureate
Abstract: While von Neumann laid the foundations of game theory by proving the decisive minimax theorem, his hopes to understand economic behavior via cooperative TU games in characteristic function form, were never shared by the so called neo-classical economists. Game theory in general and even the works of Nash, remained outside the main stream of economic theorists and their interests. By developing the general theory of cooperative games without side payments and by proving the core equivalence theorem for markets with a continuum of traders, Aumann was the first one to overcome the shortcomings of TU games and show the power of cooperative game theory to economists. Slowly economists were showing interest in non-cooperative games and the problem of selling game theoretic ideas to economists stayed with game theorists. Aumann and his galaxy of brilliant students penetrated virtually every major center for economic research with their new ideas in non-cooperative game theory like the theory of repeated games, the theory of games with incomplete information, the notions of correlated equilibria, Bayesian rationality, bounded rationality, and so on. The subtleties of mutual knowledge and common knowledge were clarified by Aumann and even in the case of some old ideas floating in folklore, had to wait till Aumann laid the formal mathematical foundations and made them precise. Often in models of bargaining or auctions, players have to develop strategic manipulations in bargaining or bidding with partial knowledge about the opponents. Text books after 1980 on game theory and microeconomic theory report in several chapters contributions by Aumann and his school and their impact in understanding economic models.
The talk will motivate some of his ideas via simple examples chosen from literature. Even high school students should be able to appreciate the ideas, though the formal proofs will challenge the best of mathematicians. He invariably relegated the difficult proofs to the last sections of his papers.
Friday December 2, 2005 at 3:00 PM in SEO 636
Web Privacy Notice HTML 5 CSS FAE
UIC LAS MSCS > persisting_utilities > seminars >